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The Risks of Childbirth: Physicians, 
Finance, and Women’s Deaths in the 
Law Courts of Seventeenth-Century 
Rome
SILVIA DE RENZI
summary: In seventeenth-century Rome a popular nancial scheme made 
it crucial to establish if pregnancy or childbirth had caused a woman’s death. 
Courts sought medical advice, and this prompted physicians to reconsider the 
issues. Their disagreements provide historians with evidence from which to reas-
sess received views of early modern doctors’ involvement with birthing bodies. 
Among others, Paolo Zacchia intervened, revealing discord between physicians 
and jurists on how to establish the causes of death. One of his testimonies in a 
case shows more broadly how legal, medical, and lay views on pregnancy and 
childbirth intersected in courts of law. In Roman tribunals the very distinction 
between healthy and preternatural births was contentious, and the parties had an 
interest in having births either proved healthy in medical terms or construed as 
pathological. The controversies, the author argues, challenge historical expecta-
tions about early modern perceptions, including the boundaries between female 
and male, private and public, healthy and pathological.
keywords: causes, childbirth, expert witnesses, legal medicine, Paolo Zacchia, 
physicians, pregnancy
Since the Middle Ages, physicians routinely provided expert testimony 
in courts of law following the Roman canon procedure. In early modern 
Continental Europe, they would testify on matters ranging from establish-
ing the causes of death in criminal cases to assessing paternity claims in 
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civil courts.1 The social and cultural signicance of lineage made issues 
of generation central to many legal controversies, and the demand for 
physicians’ expertise in these areas grew. Of the eighty-ve medicolegal 
consilia in the 1661 edition of Zacchia’s Quaestiones Medico-Legales—the 
main synthesis of legal medicine for centuries to come—just under a third 
are broadly related to sexuality and generation, including impotence, 
the right to inherit of a miscarried fetus, and the denition of conju-
gal rights.2 In her history of legal medicine, Esther Fischer-Homberger 
recognized the importance of these matters, but their implications for 
contemporary physicians have yet to be fully appreciated. Now that the 
extent and nature of physicians’ knowledge of the female body are being 
reassessed, it is useful to look again at early modern courts. At the center 
of this article are the legal controversies generated by a nancial contract 
that was popular in seventeenth-century Rome and in which payment 
depended on whether or not pregnancy had caused a woman’s death. 
Decisions called for medical judgment, but the question was novel, and 
a debate between physicians ensued. Examining their discussions allows 
me to recapture how expert testimony shaped medical discourse in sev-
enteenth-century Rome and how physicians mobilized their knowledge in 
interpreting women’s deaths. The legal arena also gives me access to the 
broader dynamics between expert and lay actors and their perceptions 
of pregnancy and childbirth.
1. The literature on early modern medical testimony in Continental courts is expanding; 
for a seminal survey: Esther Fischer-Homberger, Medizin vor Gericht: Gerichtsmedizin von der 
Renaissance bis zur Aufklärung (Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 1983); more recently: Catherine 
Crawford, “Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of Medico-
Legal Knowledge,” in Legal Medicine in History, ed. Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89–116; Alessandro Pastore, Il medico 
in tribunale: La perizia medica nella procedura penale d’antico regime (secoli XVI–XVIII) (Bellinzona, 
Switzerland: Edizioni Casagrande, 1998); Silvia De Renzi, “Witnesses of the Body: Medico-
Legal Cases in Seventeenth-Century Rome,” Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. 33A (2002): 219–42; Silvia 
De Renzi, “Resemblance, Paternity, and Imagination in Early Modern Courts,” in Heredity 
Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500–1870, ed. Staffan Müller-Wille 
and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 61–83; Gianna Pomata, 
“Malpighi and the Holy Body: Medical Experts and Miraculous Evidence in Seventeenth-
Century Italy,” Renaiss. Stud. 21 (2007): 568–86; Cathy McClive, “Blood and Expertise: The 
Trials of the Female Medical Expert in the Ancien-Régime Courtroom,” Bull. Hist. Med. 82 
(2008): 86–108.
2. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum medico-legalium tomus prior [posterior] in hac editione lugdun-
ensi ab auctore novis additionibus locupletatus (Lugduni, France: Sumptibus Ioannis-Antonii 
Huguetan & Marci-Antonii Ravaud, 1661), tomus posterior, 123–360.
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The investment was known as societas of"cii: dating back to the early 
sixteenth century, it was linked to the purchase of an ofce in the papal 
bureaucracy. The large sum of money that was required could be bor-
rowed by entering into a societas contract; the lender would then share in 
the prots. As time passed, the societas became a popular money-lending 
vehicle, in which the ofceholder provided just a front for the invest-
ment. It was short term but could be renewed every six months. Archival 
evidence suggests that in early seventeenth-century Rome the societas was 
popular in all social strata; the amount invested ranged from sums as low 
as fty scudi to two orders of magnitude more than that. The 12 percent 
interest was almost double that of other nancial “products,” but the 
societas was riskier too because should the lender die, the contract would 
be annulled with the cancellation of the borrower’s debt to the heirs of 
the deceased.3 There were two further twists. First, the lender could des-
ignate another person whose death would annul the contract. Second, 
the death of the lender or the designated person had to be natural and 
not violent (“violenta”). Violent death allowed exemption, that is, the 
borrower would have to return the money to the lender or the lender’s 
family. Death counted as violent not only by murder and in war but also 
during an epidemic,4 and if a woman was the nominated person, her 
death in pregnancy and childbirth allowed exemption too.5 As Paolo Zac-
chia explained, in addition to the causes of violent deaths they shared 
with men, women risked their lives during pregnancy and this had to be 
3. For a description of the scheme: Renata Ago, Economia barocca: Mercato e istituzioni 
nella Roma del Seicento (Rome: Donzelli, 1998), 190–95, and 193 for small sums; a specialized 
worker could earn thirty-six scudi yearly: ibid., 8–9. The wealthy Fabrizio Massimo invested 
four thousand scudi: Giovanni Incisa della Rocchetta and Nello Vian, eds., Il primo processo 
per San Filippo Neri, 4 vols. (Vatican City: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1957–63), 2:364. Like 
other investments, societas contracts were drawn up by notaries, could be transferred and used 
to repay debts, and are listed in wills. The scheme lost its appeal in the second half of the 
seventeenth century with the rise of other kinds of investment: Aldo Mazzacane, “Giambat-
tista De Luca e la <<compagnia d’ufzio>>,” in Fisco Religione Stato nell’eta’ confessionale, ed. 
Hermann Kellenbenz and Paolo Prodi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 505–30.
4. As claried in the template of the contract included in Silvestro Zacchia, De modo 
valide contrahendi Societates super of"cijs Romanae Curiae, sive ad formulam Instrumenti Societatis 
of"cij, Discursus. Accesserunt decisiones LXXXI Sacrae Rotae Rom. De materia tractantes (Rome: 
Typographia Camerae Apostolicae, 1619), pages unnumbered.
5. The template reads, “with the exception of childbirth and because of that childbirth” 
(“excepto partu et illius causa partus”), Silvestro Zacchia, De modo valide (n. 4), pages unnum-
bered. As I will show, the wording and its interpretation were contested.
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addressed to restore the balance between lenders and borrowers.6 Lend-
ers took note: linking money to a woman’s life, especially if she was of 
childbearing age, gave them more chance to save their capital than if the 
money was linked to a man. We lack statistical data, but it was common 
for husbands to invest money on the lives of their wives.7
What happened when a woman who had been designated in the con-
tract died? If borrowers and lenders disagreed on the cause of her death, 
the controversy could come to court, though starting a legal dispute may 
have been more common among wealthy families; bringing new partners 
into the contract was also an option.8 In the tangled web of Roman justice, 
various tribunals adjudicated nancial disputes, including the tribunal of 
the Auditor Camerae and, at the appeal stage, the authoritative Tribunal 
of the Sacra Rota, whose decisiones (the rationales for the judgments) were 
often published and became an important source of jurisprudence for 
courts across Europe.9 The relative novelty of the societas of"cii challenged 
Roman jurists who struggled to match it with the contracts more routinely 
discussed in the legal literature.10 On the causes of women’s deaths they 
agreed to follow the views of expert witnesses.11 Physicians responded not 
just by giving testimony; between 1602 and 1621 three of them—Marsilio 
Cagnati, Girolamo Perlini, and Paolo Zacchia—published on the issue. 
Their printed works were the tip of an iceberg: women’s deaths linked 
to the societas stirred controversies in the medical community at large.12 
The stakes were high; as Perlini put it, “Since this is of no little weight 
6. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 89.
7. Renata Ago, personal communication. Some of the features of the societas contract 
resemble life insurance schemes, which were popular in Italy at this time: Federigo Melis, 
Origini e sviluppi delle assicurazioni in Italia (sec XIV–XVI) (Rome: Istituto Nazionale delle 
Assicurazioni, 1975).
8. Ago, Economia barocca (n. 3), 192.
9. On the Rota: Niccolò Del Re, La Curia romana. Lineamenti storico-giuridici (Rome: Ediz-
ioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1970), 243–59; on the administration of civil justice in early 
modern Rome: Ago, Economia barocca (n. 3).
10. Among other works, Francesco Castracane, Tractatus de societatibus quae "unt super 
of"ciis Romanae Ecclesiae (Rome: haeredem Marci Amadori, 1590); Silvestro Zacchia, De modo 
valide (n. 4). For a survey: Mazzacane, “Giambattista De Luca” (n. 3).
11. “If it is dubious whether the pregnant woman . . . died because of her giving birth (ex 
partu) or because of another cause, the opinion of the physicians has to be upheld” (“arbitrio 
medicorum standum est”): Castracane, Tractatus (n. 10), 63. Silvestro Zacchia, De modo valide 
(n. 4), 108, referred to the same formula, “standum est iudicio medicorum.”
12. See, for example, the correspondence of the future papal physician Giulio Mancini, 
who in the 1610s gave expert testimony on a woman’s death and challenged Cagnati’s views: 
Archivio della Società di Esecutori di Pie Disposizioni, Siena: C XIX 168, fols. 721–22.
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because of the parties’ loss and interest (as the jurists have it) . . . it is to 
be investigated.”13
The nancial meaning that women’s bodies acquired in Rome is prob-
ably unique,14 but the legal requirements of the societas contracts set in 
motion practices and controversies that help us recapture contemporary 
preoccupations of broader signicance. First, the Roman disputes open 
up new perspectives from which to enrich and review standard accounts 
about expertise in the early modern pregnant and birthing body. Albeit 
intermittently, gynecology had been an area of male competence since 
ancient times, and physicians may have attended childbirth much more 
commonly than was once believed.15 Especially on the Continent and 
whenever means allowed, physicians’ competence would be sought to 
guarantee fruitful sex lives, comfortable pregnancies, and healthy prog-
eny. Research so far has focused on the period up to the sixteenth century, 
but the Roman controversies allow me to take the reassessment further 
and show how a continuing tradition shaped learned physicians’ reQec-
tions and activities as well as their patients’ expectations. They also enable 
me to reach into contemporaries’ perceptions of childbirth beyond histo-
rians’ clear-cut distinction between normal and ill-fated parturition, the 
former a social event within female competence, the latter the only occa-
sion for male practitioners to become involved, but mainly as surgeons 
removing a dead fetus.16 In Rome conQicts revolved around deaths in 
childbirth, but the parties disagreed on where to put the blame, making 
13. “Quae res cum non pauci ponderis sit ob damnum, & interesse (ut Iurisperiti loqu-
untur) partium . . . investiganda,” Girolamo Perlini, De morte caussa graviditatis, abortus, et 
partus. Medica quidem disputatio. Sed societatibus of"ciorum necessaria (Rome: Haeredes Aloysij 
Zannetti, 1607), 1.
14. The societas may have spread to other cities of the Papal State: Mazzacane, “Giambat-
tista De Luca” (n. 3).
15. Rudolph M. Bell, How to Do It: Guides to Good Living for Renaissance Italians (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Katharine Park, Secrets of Women: Gender, Generation, and 
the Origins of Human Dissection (New York: Zone Books, 2006), esp. 97–103, and 100 for 
physicians attending births; Helen King, Midwifery, Obstetrics and the Rise of Gynaecology: The 
Uses of a Sixteenth-Century Compendium (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007) on male attendance 
at normal childbirth in antiquity; Monica Green, Making Women’s Medicine Masculine: The 
Rise of Male Authority in Pre-Modern Gynaecology (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Michael R. McVaugh, Medicine before the Plague: Practitioners and Their Patients in the Crown 
of Aragon, 1285–1345 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), has stressed a 
similar involvement by late medieval physicians in Catalonia.
16. For a standard account of the English experience: Adrian Wilson, The Making of 
Man-Midwifery: Childbirth in England, 1660–1770 (London: UCL Press, 1995); for Europe: 
Jacques Gélis, History of Childbirth: Fertility, Pregnancy and Birth in Early Modern Europe, trans. 
Rosemary Morris (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991).
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the very distinction between kinds of childbirths contentious, with impor-
tant consequences for the extent of physicians’ involvement, too.
Second, the controversies throw new light on a question as central to 
early modern medicine as the concept of cause. Establishing the causes 
of diseases was the dening skill of learned practitioners, and we now 
have thorough analyses of their university training in logic and some 
sense of how this shaped bedside practice.17 By following physicians as 
they articulated their views on women’s deaths, I show how they applied 
this logic to their medicolegal activities and their intense exchanges with 
jurists, who had similar but not identical intellectual resources. Third, 
and more broadly, the clashes stirred by the contract reveal some of the 
interactions between different kinds of knowledge of the body—lay and 
professional, medical and legal—for which trial records are such a valu-
able source.18 In the Roman courts medical experts’ advice was sought 
after and assessed by judges charged with mediating between specialized 
judgment—their own and physicians’—the perspectives of lay witnesses 
and the broadly held views that constituted the common opinion, a key 
benchmark in judicial practice.19 Moreover, boundaries between lay and 
medical could be blurred as lay parties would embrace medical argu-
ments to make their claims. This, I suggest, can help historians reassess 
the notion of medicalization and develop a more nuanced understanding 
of the processes by which medical knowledge traveled and was appropri-
ated in society at large.20
Finally, by moving between the two venues where the disputes unfolded, 
the birthing room and the courtroom, I also contribute to current 
research on how knowledge of the female body was made public.21 In 
17. Ian Maclean, “Evidence, Logic, the Rule and the Exception in Renaissance Law and 
Medicine,” Early Sci. Med. 5 (2000): 227–57; Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renais-
sance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
18. Laura Gowing, Common Bodies: Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth-Century England 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); other kinds of legal documents are equally 
valuable: Katharine Park, “The Death of Isabella Della Volpe: Four Eyewitness Accounts of 
a Postmortem Caesarean Section in 1545,” Bull. Hist. Med. 82 (2008): 169–87.
19. On the appeal of comune sentire in early modern justice and its relationships to spe-
cic expertise: Renata Ago, “Una giustizia personalizzata. I tribunali civili di Roma nel XVII 
secolo,” Quaderni storici 101 (1999): 389–412.
20. I nd McVaugh’s discussion of medicalization in his Medicine before the Plague (n. 15), 
190–235, a useful framework for the later period too as demand for medical knowledge 
could come from various sectors of society and not only be the result of physicians’ strategies. 
Growing empirical research shows the limitations of the still inQuential model of imposition 
of, and resistance to, learned medical knowledge.
21. Park, Secrets of Women (n. 15).
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legal cases such as infanticides and rapes, bodily details were routinely 
discussed in front of juries or judges, redrawing the boundaries between 
private and female on the one hand and male and public on the other. 
The situation was most extreme in Rome, where the judges were often 
clerics and would engage with details such as the quality and quantity of 
female bleeding and babies’ size. We should allow for the specic pro-
cedure of Roman canon law where testimonies and reports were written 
and courtrooms were not scenes for the exhibition of evidence and cross-
examination. Still, we should also rethink who possessed knowledge of 
the pregnant body and where such knowledge was enacted.
Understanding Pregnancy, Dening Causes
When he authored his thirty-page On Death Caused by Childbirth: A Medi-
cal Discussion But Necessary to Dealing with Legal Affairs in 1602, Marsilio 
Cagnati had just been elected Protomedico—head of the College of 
Physicians—for the second time.22 A successful practitioner, he was a 
renowned university professor and a prolic writer. The title of the tract 
suggests that he was fashioning himself as an advisor on a matter that was 
bothering jurists. There is evidence of an ongoing conversation on the 
question with Giulio Benigni, a university colleague and member of the 
powerful college of the avvocati concistoriali—the elite lawyers and presti-
gious advisors to the Pope.23 Cagnati may have acted as an expert witness 
in a societas controversy, but his only cases in the Disputatio are deaths of 
pregnant women from Hippocrates’s Epidemics. A year later, he included 
the Disputatio in a collection of ve pamphlets on medical topics with 
clear political implications, from the effects on health of the river Tiber’s 
Qoods to a recent epidemic.24 Medicolegal issues and matters of public 
health provided physicians with the most effective examples of the politi-
cal signicance of their knowledge.
22. Marsilio Cagnati, De morte caussa partus medica quidem disputatio sed forensibus negotiis 
tractandis necessaria (Rome: Aloysium Zannettum, 1602). On Cagnati: Giorgio Stabile, “Cag-
nati, Marsilio,” in Dizionario biogra"co degli Italiani (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 
1973), 16:301–3; Nancy G. Siraisi, “Historiae, Natural History, Roman Antiquity, and Some 
Roman Physicians,” in Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe, ed. Gianna 
Pomata and Nancy G. Siraisi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 325–54.
23. On the power of this college: Giuliana Adorni, “Statuti del collegio degli avvocati 
concistoriali e statuti dello Studio romano,” Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 6 (1995): 
293–355.
24. Marsilio Cagnati, Opuscula varia (Rome: ex typographia Aloysii Zannetti, 1603).
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Cagnati’s discussion of the causes of women’s deaths focuses on two 
main questions, the nature of pregnancy and childbirth, and the time 
frame within which death can be attributed to them. He forcefully claimed 
that pregnancy and parturition were natural, not preternatural, the cat-
egory to which illnesses belong. As an effect of Venus, pregnancy was good 
for a woman’s health; widows and those who chose celibacy were known 
to have poorer health than regularly pregnant women. Childbirth, too, 
was natural, Cagnati argued, although he admitted that this was disputed. 
For example, some claimed that during childbirth the pelvic bones disar-
ticulate, and such separation of what should be joined would imply illness. 
Drawing on Vesalius as well as the surgeon Ambroise Paré, who allegedly 
dissected women immediately after delivery to check the position of the 
bones, Cagnati claimed that in fact the bones of the anterior pelvis are 
joined by cartilage only and so no disjunction can occur. As to the pos-
terior part of the hip bones, they too are not joined, but just close, and 
indeed in women are farther apart than in men. During childbirth they 
come further apart, but this is no disease and indeed does not require 
medical attention.25 Pregnancy and childbirth are perfectly natural.
Despite this claim, Cagnati accepted that pregnancy and childbirth 
could cause death. As he explained, external events such as a serious injury 
or internal accumulation of humors could change their nature, making 
them “praeter naturam” (outside the course of nature: pathological, we may 
say).26 This distinction may look sophistical, but in his staunch defense of 
pregnancy as a natural event, Cagnati was taking sides in a broader dis-
pute, in which, as I will show, Perlini was of the opposite opinion. While 
they both saw the denition of pregnancy as key to their discussion of 
the causes of death, they drew on fundamentally different assumptions 
about women’s bodies.
Even on the duration of puerperium, Cagnati had a clear position. His-
torians are familiar with the religious and social meanings of this special 
time after the delivery when, according to widespread opinion, a woman 
25. Cagnati, De morte in Opuscula varia (n. 24), 7–12.
26. “They die when something alien and preternatural and serious happens; and because 
of that both pregnancy and childbirth are said to become preternatural.” Ibid., 12. The 
category of preternatural is complex; on its relation to diseases in early modern medical 
discourse: Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature (n. 17), 251–69. Paolo Zacchia’s discussion of 
women’s deaths also makes it clear that physicians worked in a framework in which “praeter 
naturam” could overlap with “morbosum”: Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 71. On this 
basis, I translate preternatural with pathological, but am aware that the two concepts do 
not completely overlap.
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cleanses herself. But physicians took a view too: since the necessary pro-
cess of cleansing could be abruptly interrupted, this was when a woman 
who had given birth ran the highest risks to her health.27 The timing was 
controversial. The general assumption was that the crucial period was 
thirty days following parturition for a boy and forty-two for a girl. How-
ever, Cagnati argued, these terms do not indicate the time within which 
a woman would have to die for parturition to be blamed but the time for 
the onset of a disease.28 If a woman sickens within this time, regardless of 
when she actually dies, childbirth should be taken as responsible for her 
death. Diseases following childbirth could be slow as well as acute.
Cagnati’s view on puerperium made it easier to claim childbirth as the 
cause of death; but it also entailed replacing a simple calculation of days—
something anyone could do—with a medical account of the postpartum 
symptoms. By relativizing the chronological boundaries to the onset of 
an illness, Cagnati was advocating for proper medical competence, as 
opposed to the perceptions of laypeople, including jurists. In doing so, 
he was assuming that physicians had access to a woman’s room soon after 
birth in order to start monitoring her condition.
Cagnati shared the interest in casuistry of his contemporaries and 
so surveyed various combinations of events in which the assessment of 
causes might be difcult. But overall, he tended to believe that, short of 
a compelling alternative cause, and if the disease had started within the 
right period, pregnancy and childbirth should be regarded as the cause 
of death and exemption granted.29 The jurist Benigno was unconvinced 
and must have objected that Cagnati’s view would open a too easy road to 
exemption.30 The physician claried his position in an appendix focused 
on issues of denition, in particular the two expressions ex partu and causa 
partus, which appeared in the text of the societas contracts. Ex partu, argued 
Cagnati, referring to jurists’ use, means an immediate cause, as for exam-
ple when the baby is in the breach position or very big. If childbirth is obvi-
ously difcult and no other cause is apparent, then the conclusion must 
be that the woman died ex partu. In the expression causa partus, however, 
27. Hippocrates’s Epidemics was a standard reference for examples of how the untimely 
end of postpartum purges could cause serious illnesses.
28. Cagnati, De morte in Opuscula varia (n. 24), 17, 19.
29. Ibid., 29–30.
30. “Sermo ille, quem habuisti mecum proximis diebus, Iuli ornatissime, postquam typis 
data erant, quae de morte caussa partus scripseram; cum diceres, videri quidem tibi, me 
apte satis ad rei naturam explicandam scripsisse, sed laxam nimis viam exceptioni, cuius 
causa scripseram, fecisse.” Ibid., xxix.
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causa should be understood in the sense of “on the occasion of,” where 
“occasion” means “the appropriate time to do or to suffer something.”31 
He added that this interpretation of causa as occasion was so well known 
that he did not have to explain it. Invoking the spirit of the contract (“mens 
contrahentium”), he argued that exemption should be granted for as long 
as danger could have presented itself and that after childbirth a disease 
could start any time within thirty or forty-two days.32
Cagnati was clearly pulled in different directions. On the one hand, 
he was committed to saving the principle that only if there is an external 
cause can childbirth become lethal; on the other, he wanted to acknowl-
edge that childbirth could be legally blamed, and in a broad range of 
circumstances. So he introduced the loose interpretation of causa. But he 
was aware of friction between his medical view and its legal consequences 
and explained to his jurist colleague that if the period within which a 
death should be blamed on parturition sounded too vague, then the law 
on exemption should dene it more stringently. Short of that, “the nature 
of things should be considered and followed.”33 When positive law was 
wanting, physicians’ expertise would step in.
Through Cagnati’s exchange with his legal interlocutor we can start 
to appreciate the doctrinal framework within which learned physicians 
discussed women’s deaths; the key points were the contested nature of 
pregnancy and the denition of causality. To call for physicians’ expertise 
in the assessment of what can go wrong in the pregnant body and when, 
Cagnati did not have to understand that body as sick.34 However, follow-
ing an illustrious tradition, some of his colleagues did, including Giro-
lamo Perlini, a learned and successful physician with some ambition but 
not Cagnati’s status. In 1607, just a few years after the exchange between 
Cagnati and Benigni, he entered the arena with his On Death Caused by 
Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: A Medical Discussion But Necessary to the 
Societas Ofciorum Contracts.35 Unlike Cagnati, Perlini dealt with a specic 
31. Ibid., xxx.
32. Ibid., xxxi.
33. Ibid., xxxii.
34. According to Park, Secrets of Women (n. 15), 101, the pathologization of pregnancy 
allowed Michele Savonarola to bring it within a physician’s sphere of competence. King, 
Midwifery (n. 15), 22, makes a similar point.
35. Perlini, De morte caussa graviditatis (n. 13). From his native Forlì in the Romagna 
region (part of the Papal State), Perlini had won the trust of important patients and patrons 
in Rome. He also wrote on how to compile medical cases: Historia medica, physiologica, 
pathologica et therapeutica . . . cui adiecta est methodus compendiaria scribendi huiusmodi historias 
(Rome: Facciotti, 1610).
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case. Domitilla De Finibus was seven months pregnant when she suddenly 
developed fever; her baby died, and soon after so did she. But what had 
caused her death, the fever as an external event or the death of the fetus, 
and therefore pregnancy?
Why Pregnancy Can Kill
Perlini’s tract opens with the written testimonies ("des) of both the 
woman’s attending physician and the surgeon who dissected her; it is 
probable that Perlini had been asked to resolve their disagreement.36 
The "des exemplify the short and rather formulaic reports that physi-
cians and surgeons would routinely submit to the legal authorities in 
cases of suspicious deaths.37 The physician provided a brief account of the 
events: after spontaneously suffering from fever, the woman was ercely 
troubled “on the occasion” of the death of the fetus on the seventh day; 
the following day she herself was dead. As we know, the expression “on 
the occasion of” could be used to indicate a causal relationship, but the 
doctor did not draw any explicit conclusion and likely inclined toward 
blaming the fever as a phenomenon unrelated to pregnancy.38 By contrast, 
the surgeon was unambiguous. He had opened the body and found that 
the baby had suffocated in the waters and was almost entirely putreed. 
This, he concluded, had caused Domitilla’s death. The postmortem may 
have taken place as a matter of routine or because all those involved in 
the contract were poised to start a legal controversy and a dissected body 
would be key evidence. Either way, autopsies were uncontroversial in early 
modern Rome.
No short report, a learned discussion frames Perlini’s engagement 
with the details of the case; the dedicatee Antonio Portius, a jurist from 
the Romagna region, may have been the judge in charge.39 InQuenced by 
Aristotelian misogyny, but equally drawing on Galen and Fernel, Perlini 
held an extremely bleak view of pregnancy. The common assumption was 
that menstrual blood nourishes the fetus, but some can accumulate, and 
this, Perlini claimed, disposes pregnant women to disease.40 That he could 
36. On physicians resolving clashing testimonies of lower status practitioners: De Renzi, 
“Witnesses of the Body” (n. 1). The printed reports omit the practitioners’ names.
37. Pastore, Il medico in tribunale (n. 1). 
38. This emerges from Perlini’s subsequent discussion.
39. On Portius: Giorgio V. Marchesi, Vitae virorum illustrium foroliviensium (Forlì, Italy: 
Typographia Pauli Sylvae, 1726), 184–85.
40. Perlini, De morte caussa graviditatis (n. 13), 8–10.
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make childbirth equivalent to a “crisis,” “the solution, as it were, of a seri-
ous preternatural condition of the body”—conrms that he understood 
pregnancy and childbirth in fundamentally pathological terms.41
Within this framework, Perlini argued that the death of the fetus, 
and therefore pregnancy, had brought about Domitilla’s death: the case 
qualied for an exemption.42 He could not deny that she had been well 
until fever struck, but, he insisted, pregnancy makes serious diseases fatal. 
The fever had causes other than pregnancy, but on its own would have 
remained unresolved and ambiguous (“anceps”); only in conjunction with 
pregnancy and the consequent death of the fetus had it killed her.43 Per-
lini explained the various reasons why pregnancy worsens otherwise not 
necessarily lethal conditions. Pregnant women cannot be treated as they 
should; purging is bad before the fourth and after the seventh month and 
diet cannot be regulated appropriately because the child needs nourish-
ment in the right amount and quality.44 With treatment hampered, dis-
eases worsen, the fetus is likely to die, and as a result the mother dies too. 
More generally, Perlini argued for a distinction between acute diseases and 
acute diseases with “additamentum,” complications, we may say.45 The main 
cause of complication is the age and general condition of the patient, but 
in this view, pregnancy similarly amplies the effects of an acute disease. 
Mobilizing his philosophical background and siding with the Arabic phi-
losopher Averroes, Perlini argued that in matters of health and illness 
the qualities of the subject are more important than those of the agent; a 
patient’s condition, not the disease, determines the outcome.
Constantly shifting between doctrinal statements and the case of 
Domitilla, Perlini carried on the philosophical game. Which cause is to 
be blamed? Without doubt, he wrote, the one without which the effect 
ceases and which, by its presence, brings about the effect (“qua data, 
datur effectus”).46 The implicit conclusion was that pregnancy caused 
Domitilla’s death because, had it been possible to remove it, death would 
not have occurred. Perlini admitted that pregnant women can fall sick 
independently of their condition, for example, when they suffer from 
apoplexy. However, external illnesses are often only a preliminary (“pro-
41. Ibid., 10.
42. Ibid., 16.
43. Ibid., 25.
44. Ibid., 11–12.
45. Ibid., 21.
46. Ibid., 25.
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catartica”) cause, with limited effects in the absence of an internal stimulus 
(“fomentum”).47
While the fever began outside Domitilla’s pregnancy, the progress, 
intensication, and force of the disease clearly originated within.48 It 
is, concluded Perlini, like when during a plague epidemic all diseases 
become pestilential due to the vice of the air; similarly, diseases affecting 
pregnant women are made ercer by the trials and tribulations of preg-
nancy.49 The comparison illustrates the persistent power of plague as a 
model for thinking about diseases: Perlini could hardly have driven home 
the link between pregnancy and death more strongly. If, he continued, 
the suppression of purges after birth is damaging to a woman’s health, 
how much more serious was a putreed fetus in her womb? His image of 
a sword cutting the throat of the woman vividly evoked the violent deaths 
that were an established reason for exemption.50 In Domitilla’s case, the 
baby’s corpse was not just putreed but “sphacelatus,” a technical term 
indicating a stage further than putrefaction, and so much so that the Qesh 
came off the Qesh and even off the bones at the slightest touch.51 Perlini 
had either attended the autopsy or received a full report; if surgeons were 
in charge of extracting dead fetuses, physicians were ready to use their 
appearance as evidence.
While discussing the still open question of the nature of pregnancy, 
Perlini made another point that shows how the dispute was also rooted 
in broader discussions of generation. How was a death by mola to be 
assessed in relation to the nancial scheme? A mola was a Qeshy forma-
tion of controversial origins that could mimic symptoms of pregnancy but 
remain in the womb for years. Perlini argued that a mola should provide 
grounds for exemption because as the product of the mixing of seeds it 
should be regarded as similar to a conception. For legal purposes, it did 
not matter that without proper concoction it remained shapeless Qesh. 
But a clear distinction should be made from false molae (growths of some 
other kinds) that are not the result of conception; these should not grant 
exemption.52 To an anonymous physician’s objection that more often 
than Perlini was prepared to admit external illnesses, and not pregnancy, 
47. Ibid., 33.
48. Ibid., 19.
49. Ibid., 25.
50. Ibid., 15.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 34. For a survey of contemporary discussions in Rome on the nature of mola: 
Maria Conforti, “‘Afrmare quod intus sit divinare est’: mole, mostri e vermi in un caso di 
falsa gravidanza di ne Seicento,” Quaderni Storici 130 (2009): 125–52.
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caused death, he responded with a second edition in 1610; but he merely 
expanded his arguments.
Further research may throw light on why Cagnati and Perlini held such 
different views on the pregnant body, but in their arguments and defenses 
they shared a distinctive medical tradition and knew where they stood in 
relation to their legal counterparts. In these very years, however, a differ-
ent approach to medicolegal duties was promoted by Cagnati’s former 
student, Paolo Zacchia, who at the beginning of the 1620s took up the 
pressing issue of women’s deaths.
A Medicolegal Perspective
From a family of jurists and physicians, Zacchia had not reached his later 
fame but was building authority as the compiler of the Quaestiones Medico-
Legales which were published between 1621 and 1635.53 Issues of genera-
tion gure prominently in the rst book: sandwiched between a chapter 
on pregnancy and molae and one on children’s resemblance to their par-
ents is a dense chapter on childbirth as a cause of death in relation to the 
societas scheme.54 Characteristically, Zacchia provided a comprehensive 
and systematic discussion, engaging with medical sources ranging much 
more widely than those used by Cagnati and Perlini: on women’s diseases 
he deployed medieval collections such as those authored by Trotula and 
recent physicians including Girolamo Mercuriale and Rodrigo de Castro, 
but also Giovanni Marinello, the author in 1563 of the successful Medicine 
partenenti alle infermità’ delle donne. Zacchia’s familiarity with the legal lit-
erature is also remarkable; here, familiarity is textual but also literal: one 
of the main legal sources on societas was his brother Silvestro’s tract, from 
which he quoted abundantly. Early modern relations between jurists and 
medical expert witnesses could be intensely personal instead of merely 
professional and bureaucratic.
Zacchia’s specic medicolegal perspective emerges clearly in his dis-
cussion of the three issues on which I have focused so far: the nature of 
pregnancy, the denition and hierarchy of causes, and the status of molae. 
While professing unreserved respect for his teacher Cagnati, Zacchia 
denounced the unresolved tensions in his argument. The denition of 
pregnancy and parturition as natural was either false or failed to deal with 
53. On his biography: Silvia De Renzi, “Per una biograa di Paolo Zacchia: nuovi docu-
menti e ipotesi di ricerca,” in Paolo Zacchia: Alle origini della medicina legale, 1584–1659, ed. 
Alessandro Pastore and Giovanni Rossi (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008), 50–73.
54. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 66–90.
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the question at hand. Like any natural process, pregnancy can become 
preternatural and bring about disease and death. It is therefore unhelpful, 
maintained Zacchia, to mobilize general natural philosophical and medi-
cal arguments in the context of legal discussions dealing with pregnancies 
and childbirths that by denition were praeter naturam. While giving their 
advice on the causes of women’s deaths, physicians should rather engage 
with the specicity of jurists’ questions.55 Physicians who had relied solely 
on their medical approach had allowed jurists to pass bad judgments.56 
Aware that new objects of investigation were emerging at the intersection 
between medicine and the law—indeed a whole new doctrine was taking 
shape—here as elsewhere in the Quaestiones, Zacchia encouraged physi-
cians to embrace novel medicolegal tasks.57
Sharing the reservations of the jurist Benigni, to whom he too dedi-
cated his discussion, Zacchia also objected to Cagnati’s point that pre-
cisely because pregnancy or childbirth become dangerous only when a 
preternatural event changes their nature, most of the time they can be 
blamed for the death. This, he argued, would make all cases exceptions.58 
Perlini’s broad claim that pregnancy is a disease was equally Qawed, con-
tradicted by what usually happens and by the entire medical tradition 
from Galen to Fernel, according to which conception and pregnancy are 
natural processes of concoction similar to digestion.59 Despite starting 
from opposite premises, Perlini’s conclusions were remarkably similar 
to Cagnati’s: pregnancy and childbirth tended to provide unconditional 
grounds for exemption. This, Zacchia argued, would turn the whole of 
pregnancy into a risk-free zone for the lender, and the contract would 
dangerously resemble usury.60 To Zacchia, it was right that a medicolegal 
expert should engage with such consequences, as his discussion of the 
complicated status of molae further illustrates. Unlike Perlini, Zacchia 
tended to regard a mola as a disease—even if it is the fruit of an interrupted 
conception; as such it should not provide grounds for exemption. To the 
counterargument that mola is uniquely female, and therefore introduces 
an imbalance between lender and borrower, he replied that no other 
55. Ibid., 71.
56. Ibid., 89.
57. On Zacchia’s specic medicolegal perspective: Marco Boari, “Prospettive di medi-
azione tra sapere medico e sapere giuridico nell’opera di Paolo Zacchia,” in Pastore and 
Rossi, Paolo Zacchia (n. 53), 91–99.
58. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 70–71, 86.
59. Ibid., 87.
60. Ibid., 89.
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uterine condition was grounds for exemption and so neither should mola. 
Furthermore, a mola can last for many years; should death caused by mola 
allow exemption, the terms of the contract would be suspended for even 
longer than the duration of pregnancy, and this would be unfair to the 
borrower.61 In Zacchia’s hands, the question of women’s deaths became 
a powerful example with which to argue for the specic competence of 
the medicolegal expert, who, while mastering medical doctrine, was also 
able to consider the social and legal implications of his decisions.
At the core of the controversy was an issue of interpretation. As Zac-
chia stated, when reading the expressions ex partu and causa partus phy-
sicians, “not comprehending the meaning of these words correctly, did 
not understand the essence of the said contract, because they explained 
the thing according to their way of understanding; by contrast we inter-
pret the words in themselves and one by one, so that we can follow their 
true sense.”62 Physicians’ “way of understanding” had allowed Cagnati to 
argue that causa should be taken as “on occasion”; but this was gibberish.63 
Although inexperienced notaries may have used the expressions causa 
et occasione in drafting the contracts, words should be understood much 
more rigorously. “Ex” refers to the immediate and closest (immediata et 
proxima) cause,64 and so death ex partu should comprise only those difcult 
childbirths that bring about such turmoil of humors and spirits that death 
is inevitable. And with causa partus we should include effects that originate 
from childbirth, such as the retention of the placenta or the suppression 
of postpartum purges.65 In all these cases exemption should be granted 
because they comply with the legal requirement that pregnancy and 
childbirth be “principal, primary, immediate and nal causes” of death.66 
A clear line then should be drawn to exclude those cases in which preg-
nancy and childbirth are merely “nurturing” (foventes) or “contributing” 
(coadiutrices) causes.67 Typically, this happens when an acute fever devel-
ops before childbirth and leads to death: whereas Perlini had argued that 
61. Ibid., 76.
62. “Horum verborum sensum non integre assequentes medici, praedictae pactionis 
vim non intellexerunt, quia rem secundum proprium intelligendi modum exposuerunt; 
nos autem iam ea verba singula per se explanemus, ut verum eorum sensum assequi pos-
simus”; ibid., 72.
63. “Hallucinati sunt medici,” ibid., 73.
64. Ibid., 72.
65. Ibid., 76–77. Sometimes Zacchia uses the expression ex causa partus.
66. Ibid., 71.
67. Ibid., 89.
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even here pregnancy was the ultimate cause, Zacchia believed that fever 
is not always related to pregnancy and therefore should not automatically 
provide grounds for exemption.68
Dening causes and establishing their hierarchy were the bread and 
butter of both jurists’ and physicians’ training in logic, though they 
developed different approaches to the tasks, partly a consequence of 
their different professional remits.69 To account for the complexity 
of phenomena related to health and sickness and the wide range of 
individual responses to diseases, physicians had multiplied the number 
of causes and were used to mobilizing a looser and more Qexible system 
of categories and arguments. Cagnati’s suggestion that his interpretation 
of “cause” as “occasion” was widely accepted illustrates such an approach. 
Jurists were overall more economical and stringent in using categories, 
and courtrooms, the only territory that brought together physicians and 
jurists, would make their different views apparent. If physicians wanted to 
play the key role they deserved, argued Zacchia, they had to reconsider 
their lax understanding of causes.
Medicolegal tasks required more rigorous thinking from physicians, but 
Zacchia also disagreed with the rationale sustaining some of the jurists’ 
conclusions. For example, he criticized judges of the Rota for identify-
ing the wrong sequence of causes leading to a woman’s death in a case 
adjudicated in 1612. Zacchia provides scant details but refers to Silvestro 
Zacchia’s tract where the decision of the Rota is fully reported. So we can 
compare the judges’ and the physician’s approach.70
A pregnant woman who had already been troubled by kidney dif-
culties developed fever and measles; after miscarrying with great loss of 
blood, she died. The judges argued that although the miscarriage had 
taken place after the fever, the former should be considered the cause of 
death and exemption granted. The legal template for their conclusion 
was the commentaries of the Roman Lex Aquilia (Digest, 9.2) about a 
seriously wounded slave who dies in a shipwreck: the shipwreck is a stron-
ger cause of death than a wound and should be regarded as the cause 
of death.71 The same rationale applied to the woman’s case, in that the 
68. Ibid., 80–81, for various cases of fever before and after birth that should not grant 
exemption.
69. Maclean, “Evidence, Logic, the Rule” (n. 17).
70. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 79; Silvestro Zacchia, De modo valide 
(n. 4), 172–77.
71. Silvestro Zacchia, De modo valide (n. 4), 174. The Lex Aquilia was about the compensa-
tion of damage to property, including a slave; the ensuing legal tradition examined compli-
cated sequences of events that would make it hard to establish responsibility; for the text: 
The Digest of Justinian, Latin text edited by Theodor Mommsen with the aid of Paul Krueger,
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miscarriage of a premature or dead fetus was a stronger cause of death 
than fever. The woman’s attending physician too had argued that the 
miscarriage had caused death: attending physicians’ views, claimed the 
judges, should be upheld and in very uncertain cases the party that would 
lose his investment should be favored—this meant giving preference to 
exemption.72 At an appeal the judges conrmed their decision: invoking 
again the case of the slave, they now added that in the same way as the 
shipwreck made it impossible to assess if the wound had caused death, so 
the loss of blood caused by the miscarriage made it impossible to assess if 
the fever and measles had caused the woman’s death. Moreover, during 
pregnancy the woman had already been troubled by kidney problems, 
so even if fever had caused the miscarriage, pregnancy with its tribula-
tions might have caused the fever in the rst place. A correct sequence 
of causes, the judges argued, should be reconstructed as follows: the rst 
cause was the pregnancy and the last the miscarriage; as an intermediate 
cause fever was irrelevant.
To Zacchia the judges’ assumption that miscarrying is a stronger cause 
of death than fever was wrong; on the contrary, acute fever is more able to 
kill per se, while miscarrying kills only when accompanied by intervening 
problems. As evidence, he cited those women who lose their children with 
little fuss and no consequences (especially, he conceded, at the begin-
ning of pregnancy).73 Elsewhere he had also challenged the tendency 
of nonexperts to regard loss of blood as compelling evidence of gravity, 
when, in fact, medical knowledge shows that this is not always the case.74 
At stake here was the medical ability to establish the proper hierarchy of 
causes, something that lay witnesses or even jurists might lack altogether.75 
But Zacchia seems to have been objecting also to the judges’ reliance on 
cases that the legal tradition had singled out as exemplary. Both jurists 
and physicians used such cases to frame and discuss matters at hand—
Hippocrates’s cases often played a similar role—but where the body, with 
its huge variations, was the focus of the dispute, only medical expertise 
could assess the relevance of a textual case.
English translation edited by Alan Watson, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1985), 1:277–93, esp. 281.
72. Silvestro Zacchia. De modo valide (n. 4), 175.
73. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 79.
74. On wounds: ibid., tomus prior, 343.
75. Silvia De Renzi, “La natura in tribunale. Conoscenze e pratiche medico-legali a Roma 
nel XVII secolo,” Quaderni Storici 108 (2001): 799–822.
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To help his colleagues get to grips with the thorny issue of women’s 
deaths, Zacchia classied the cases where exemption was to be granted, 
where it was not to be, and where the decision was particularly difcult. 
Examining deaths ex partu, Zacchia thoroughly described the phases of 
childbirth, including the anatomy and function of various bodily parts. So 
he argued that distress during childbirth could originate in the mother 
(she could be too fat or too thin), in the fetus (either too big or weak), in 
the womb (too hard, scarred, or with too small a neck), in the membranes 
(“panniculi”)76 surrounding the fetus (they could break too soon or not 
at all), or even in the excrements (the waters) that are expelled with it 
(if they come out too soon, they do not fulll their specic purpose of 
easing delivery).77 References to works by the anatomist Realdo Colombo 
and Paré, as well as to Hippocrates, are interspersed in the discussion, 
evidence that knowledge of various aspects of childbirth was central, not 
marginal to medical investigations, and was being revised according to 
the latest works. While showing a remarkable familiarity with birth, Zac-
chia was assuming, or at least encouraging, the same in his colleagues. It 
is worth pausing to consider the evidence of physicians’ practice among 
women in early modern Rome.
At Women’s Bedsides
Research into women’s experiences of pregnancy in Rome has only just 
begun, but the evidence from the correspondence of prosperous families 
is that physicians were a regular presence even though female relation-
ships, especially between mother and daughter, were the main source 
of advice. One of the women of the wealthy Spada family, for example, 
suggested remedies for her daughter’s morning sickness and also recom-
mended not informing the doctor about her problems. By contrast, the 
mother of noblewoman Artemisia Colonna sent her personal physician to 
care for her pregnant daughter, while the daughter’s husband took advice 
76. Literally, panniculi mean pieces of cloth; other contemporary writers would call the 
membranes tunicae. On this terminology: Barbara Duden, “Zwischen ‘wahrem Wissen’ und 
Prophetie: Konzeptionen des Ungeborenen,” in Geschichte des Ungeborenen. Zur Erfahrungs- 
und Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Schwangerschaft, 17.–20. Jahrhundert, ed. Barbara Duden, 
Jürgen Schlumbohm, and Patrice Veit (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2002), 11–48.
77. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus prior, 75.
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from another doctor.78 A major concern for physicians was how to treat 
pregnant women without causing a miscarriage, an issue acknowledged 
by Perlini and discussed, for example, in the consultation with a pregnant 
woman included in Silvio Lanceano’s work of 1602. Today an unknown 
physician, Lanceano enjoyed a reputation among wealthy Roman fami-
lies; tackling several problems surrounding generation, he also discussed 
the various techniques with which to ensure that fetal membranes, molae, 
and dead fetuses could be expelled; he recommended administering pes-
saries and oral medicines.79 Expelling the placenta was a crucial phase of 
childbirth and worried physicians deeply. In his case collection of 1600, 
Giovanni Zecchi, who taught at the university and became papal physician, 
also discussed medical methods of expulsion, including oral remedies, 
before suggesting that, if all else failed, a midwife or surgeon could pull it 
out. Roughly at the same time, a Roman physician administered lozenges 
to purge the womb of a woman whose baby had probably died in situ.80
I am not suggesting that physicians attended childbirth routinely; if 
things looked normal, this remained the remit of relatives, friends, and, 
gradually, midwives, who could also deal with births made difcult by 
the baby’s position.81 But as in Bologna, even in Rome physicians were 
expected to provide advice on a series of crucial aspects of delivery and 
were building up specic competence; checking the condition of the 
78. For Spada: Marina D’Amelia, “Diventare madre nel XVII secolo: l’esperienza di una 
nobile romana,” in Tempi e spazi di vita femminile tra medioevo ed età moderna, ed. Silvana Seidel 
Menchi, Anne Jacobson Schutte, and Thomas Kuehn (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 279–310; 
for Colonna: Giuseppe Gabrieli, ed., Il Carteggio Linceo (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei 
Lincei, 1996), 469. For the relationships between mother and pregnant daughter: Susan 
Broomhal, “‘Women’s Little Secrets.’ Dening the Boundaries of Reproductive Knowledge 
in Sixteenth-Century France,” Soc. Hist. Med. 15 (2002): 1–15. It is hard to nd for Italy such 
a rich source as the English vernacular print, which has provided much insight into female 
experience and nonmedical perceptions of women’s bodies, as in Mary Fissell, Vernacular Bod-
ies. The Politics of Reproduction in Early Modern England (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2004). More broadly on rituals of birth in Italy: Jacqueline Marie Musacchio, The Art and 
Ritual of Childbirth in Renaissance Italy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).
79. Silvio Lanceano, De molae generatione & cura, de foetus formatione, & alijs quibusdam 
(Rome: Lepidum Facium et Stephanum Paulinum, 1602).
80. Giovanni Zecchi, Liber primus consultationum medicinalium (Rome: Facciotti, 1600), 345; 
for the lozenges: Elizabeth S. Cohen, “Miscarriages of Apothecary Justice: Un-Separate Spaces 
of Work and Family in Early Modern Rome,” Renaiss. Stud. 21 (2007): 480–504, esp. 501.
81. Claudio Schiavoni, “L’attività delle levatrici o ‘mammane’ a Roma tra XVI e XVIII 
secolo: storia sociale di una professione,” Sociologia 35 (2001): 41–58: in 1591 only 22 per-
cent of births were assisted by midwives and not just by relatives; by 1645 the gure had 
risen to 46 percent.
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womb immediately after birth already fell within their sphere.82 A com-
bination of patronage relations and the duty of charity, which included 
making physicians available to one’s clients or servants, meant that in 
Rome physicians’ advice was available to a broader range of women than 
usually thought. In 1561 the musician in the service of Cardinal Farnese 
called in a physician when it was clear that the baby was stuck and his wife 
half dead. While the midwife objected that the only physician needed was 
God, the husband was happy to take advantage of the physician—not a 
surgeon—attending his cardinal patron.83 When the wife of apothecary 
Pasquini was ill immediately after giving birth, he called a physician, “as 
is customary in these cases,” he explained.84
Inspection of a female body may have remained taboo for male prac-
titioners, but this was no obstacle to physicians’ full engagement with a 
woman’s gynecological history, a continuum in which giving birth and 
miscarrying were key episodes rather than completely separate events. 
When a Roman noblewoman started to suffer from uterine disorders, a 
midwife inspected her internally and found a tumor; the attending phy-
sicians consulted a senior colleague who suggested that one of its causes 
was the frequent miscarriages; he recommended pessaries.85
Further research will rene this picture, but the evidence is that Zac-
chia’s medical readers attended women and were expected to cultivate 
specic competence—practical as well as textual—over gynecological 
problems and pregnancies and, to some extent, childbirth, too. From 1615 
medical students in Rome were offered a course on women’s diseases.86 
On this basis, when requested, physicians would advise on the causes of 
women’s deaths, as Domitilla’s attending doctor and Perlini did. Zacchia 
himself was not only a superb synthesizer but also a sought-after expert 
82. For seventeenth-century Bologna: Pastore, Il medico in tribunale (n. 1), 88–90.
83. However, I am cautious about drawing clear-cut boundaries between surgeons and 
physicians, as surgeons in Rome could obtain a university degree. For another interesting 
example of the Quid boundaries between medical practitioners in Rome, see the midwife 
who in 1576 carried out a caesarean section, as quoted in Ottavia Niccoli, “Corps maternels. 
Les mystères de la génération aux débuts de l’époque moderne,” Micrologus 17 (2009): 
379–97, 396.
84. Both cases are in Incisa della Rocchetta and Vian, Il primo processo (n. 3), 1:5 and 
1:262.
85. Angelo Vittori, Medicae consultationes (Rome: Ex ofcina typographica Caballina, 
1640), 267–69. Evidence that late medieval physicians would inspect and touch the female 
body is urging historians to reassess the strength of the taboo: Park, Secrets of Women (n. 
15), 100.
86. Emanuele Conte, ed., I Maestri della Sapienza di Roma dal 1514 al 1787: I rotuli e altre 
fonti, 2 vols. (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1991), 1:181.
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witness. Of the eight consilia concerning the societas in the 1661 edition 
of the Quaestiones, only one deals with the alleged death of a man from 
plague—the controversy stemmed from the fact that epidemics provided 
grounds for exemption. The other seven concern the causes of death 
in pregnant women or women who had recently given birth. I now con-
sider how Zacchia fullled his duty as an expert witness and explore the 
dynamics between his knowledge and other views of the pregnant body 
in court.
The Court as the Crossroads of Knowledge
Sometime in the 1610s Cecilia Blancaria died, three months after giving 
birth and after a short fever and abdominal pain. Her husband reckoned 
the lapse of time no obstacle to claiming that childbirth caused her death 
and wanted to recoup the money he had linked to her life. Zacchia had 
been asked for advice either by the borrower—who, as we might expect, 
refused to return the money—or by the judge; either way he was con-
vinced that the death was not the result of childbirth or pregnancy. He 
built his consilium around three key claims: rst, the time lapse was rel-
evant; second, Cecilia’s parturition had been natural; and third, an alter-
native and adequate cause explained her illness and death.87 Zacchia’s 
consilium brings me as close as currently possible to the dynamics among 
the parties, witnesses, expert witnesses, and jurists adjudicating on the 
causes of a woman’s death.88
Implicitly rejecting Cagnati’s broad understanding of the time limits 
of puerperium, Zacchia argued that the mere passage of time between 
birth and death meant that parturition could not be blamed: after ninety 
days any cause of troubles linked to childbirth would have weakened and 
then ceased. To endorse this claim Zacchia mobilized Aristotle’s argument 
about the temporal efcacy of a cause. By contrast, because Zacchia had 
never attended Cecilia, to claim that parturition had been healthy he 
relied on the testimony of other witnesses, one in particular. His (or her) 
account was so crucial that Zacchia even reported it verbatim: “I know 
that signora Cecilia gave birth to a son very happily” (felicissimamente). It 
87. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus posterior, 255–57.
88. I have not yet been able to locate the record of the case in the Rota archive or the 
lower court in which the trial may have begun. I deduce the date from the fact that the 
consilium contains no reference to Zacchia’s own work (published in 1621) but does quote 
Cagnati and Perlini. It was published in a later edition of Zacchia’s Quaestiones.
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is hard to guess from the word signora what the witness’s relationship to 
Cecilia was—a relative, a servant, perhaps the attending midwife—but in 
Zacchia’s hands the merely descriptive adverb was given a strongly medical 
interpretation. “Felicissimamente,” he explained, indicates that everything, 
from the time of delivery to the duration of labor and the quality of pain, 
and from the position of the fetus to the expulsion of the placenta, had 
gone according to nature, “naturaliter.” Even the purges postpartum had 
been normal. So, Zacchia concluded, Cecilia had not fallen sick because 
of childbirth (ex culpa partus), and neither should the death be blamed 
on events following childbirth (ex causa partus).
By contrast, one of the parties claimed that at some point Cecilia’s 
purges had weakened and that together with the abdominal pain they 
showed that something had gone wrong after childbirth. Once again, Zac-
chia found in the witnesses’ testimony an alternative explanation. They 
had unanimously testied that her husband’s illness had upset Cecilia 
deeply. That this could reduce the purges, Zacchia claimed, was known 
to everyone, even old women (“aniculae”).89 Furthermore, the abdominal 
pain had not forced Cecilia to bed and neither had she sought medical 
assistance from either a doctor or some other practitioner; no bloodlet-
ting had been prescribed. There was enough evidence to conclude that 
the pain was mild and could not have caused the ensuing acute illness: 
severe illnesses require strong causes. Indeed after giving birth Cecilia had 
regained perfect health; again Zacchia maintained this both by mobiliz-
ing ordinary observations probably supplied by lay witnesses—Cecilia had 
attended to her domestic chores90—and also by adding a medical spin to 
what at least two witnesses had observed: her periods had started again. 
To Zacchia this conrmed that even with regard to natural actions (“quoad 
actiones naturales”) Cecilia was in good health.
Without the trial record we cannot identify the witnesses and so do 
not know who testied that menstruation had returned: the attending 
doctor, a midwife, a relative, or all of them. However, we can assume that 
it was presented as a relatively simple fact and, by contrast, we can follow 
Zacchia as he interwove it into his doctrinal discussion. He started with a 
general assertion: breastfeeding women do not usually menstruate. Ceci-
lia did. His explanation was that perhaps nature was providing for the 
89. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus posterior, 256.
90. The suspension from routine domestic tasks has been regarded as a key element 
of connement: Wilson, Making of Man-Midwifery (n. 16); contemporaries might consider 
doing chores as a sign of regained normality after parturition: Musacchio, Art and Ritual 
(n. 78), 22.
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previous weakening of the postpartum purges. Even assuming that child-
birth had troubled the woman, the early return of menstruation conclu-
sively showed that Cecilia was now healthy. She had completely overcome 
her tribulations and any possible cause of illness had ceased. The following 
fever could not be the effect of the previous events. This was also proven 
by the nature of her illness. It had been an acute, fast, and almost pesti-
lential condition, certainly caused by an abundance of hot humors. But 
as Hippocrates maintained, the reduction of the discharges rather leads 
to the accumulation of cold, thick humors, followed by chronic rather 
than acute illnesses. All in all, it was clear to Zacchia that Cecilia’s fever 
and death were unrelated to her giving birth. And even conceding that 
the reduction of purges might have affected Cecilia’s health—Zacchia 
frequently makes this kind of concession—this would be at most a con-
tributing factor (“ut causa remota seu potius ut causa fovens”) and not the 
primary and immediate cause, which alone could grant exemption.91
I draw several conclusions from Zacchia’s consilium. During the trial, 
various accounts of Cecilia’s parturition and subsequent health were 
produced as witnesses, male and female, relatives, acquaintances, and 
probably the attending physician and midwife, answered the notary’s 
questions, reconsidered past events, and built their own narratives. As an 
expert witness, Zacchia had access to these and in his consilium expertly 
interwove them to prove his point.92 In his prose we hear the voice of a 
family celebrating a happy event, their subsequent account of Cecilia’s 
discomfort, the description of her return to normal activities both from a 
social perspective (she could do her chores) and from one more attentive 
to bodily functions (her menstruation had started), the concern of her 
relatives for her emotional turmoil, but equally their comments—surely 
responding to a precise question—that no midwife or doctor had come 
to see her following her abdominal pain, and nally the account of her 
deterioration and the attempt to link it to childbirth. While Zacchia’s key 
sources of authority are Hippocrates and contemporary learned physi-
cians, he equally sought to persuade by knowledge that everyone, even 
old women, possessed. In the legal arena their usually despised opinions 
could be used to represent that common belief that was so important in 
early modern legal procedure: what everyone knows and knows in the 
same way.93 Drawing on what even old women knew, Zacchia reached 
91. Paolo Zacchia, Quaestionum (n. 2), tomus posterior, 257.
92. This was routine: De Renzi, “Witnesses of the Body” (n. 1).
93. For this denition, if for an earlier period: Daniel Lord Smail, “Witness Programs 
in Medieval Marseille,” in Voices from the Bench: The Narratives of Lesser Folk in Medieval Tri-
als, ed. Michael Goodich (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 227–50, 247; on judges
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out, making his expertise more accessible to those who lacked it; here, 
crucially, the legal experts he wanted to persuade.
In Roman canon law the credibility of lay witnesses was weighted 
according to status, gender, and age, but the judges took full account of 
their perspectives. That jurists could ask and witnesses answer questions 
about the degree and nature of Cecilia’s abdominal pain, the weaken-
ing of her discharges, and then the return of menstruation shows that 
all the actors involved in the controversies shared a language for, and 
understanding of, pregnancy and childbirth. But this was not necessar-
ily medical; after all, the very existence of the societas contract was based 
on the common awareness that pregnancy was potentially dangerous: 
explanations for what could go wrong could be found in widely held 
perceptions of the pregnant body. To place physicians’ expertise in the 
right perspective, it is also important to consider that the judges would 
be guided by legal, moral, and political concerns, and in their sentences 
medical reasoning could be overruled if, as we have seen, it was felt that 
lenders should be favored.94
However, Zacchia’s strong medical spin on the lay testimonies shows 
that the legal setting did impose a hierarchy and fostered medical 
accounts. The law established that to gain exemption a clear sequence 
of causes leading from childbirth and pregnancy to death had to be 
produced. Learned physicians (here as opposed to lay witnesses or non-
learned medical practitioners) were regarded as best equipped to provide 
or exclude it; they added a rened account of causation, a more precise 
estimate of the timing of events, and doctrinal authority.95 Although phy-
sicians were often advising judges, medical reports could be submitted to 
support a party’s claim and the power of medical reasoning would become 
obvious to ordinary Roman citizens who could play the legal game and 
either resort to using physicians as expert witnesses or appropriating 
mediating between specic expertise and common knowledge: Boari, Prospettive di mediazi-
one (n. 57), 93. For a later period and a different legal system, the expert’s ability to “map 
scientic fact on to the broader and less stable network of public belief” has been stressed 
in Ian Burney, Poison, Detection, and the Victorian Imagination (Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press, 2006), 53.
94. Mary Lindemann, “The Body Debated: Bodies and Rights in Seventeenth- and 
Eighteenth-Century Germany,” J. Mediev. Early Mod. Stud. 38 (2008): 493–521 warns us not 
to assume that physicians’ views would automatically outweigh lay witnesses’ testimony, or 
the authority of religious and civic institutions.
95. In the case examined by Cohen, “Miscarriages of Apothecary Justice” (n. 80), while a 
neighbor testied that the woman had not felt the baby for several days, the midwife and the 
physicians made a more precise estimate based on the condition of the miscarried fetus.
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medical arguments themselves in the pursuit of their interests.96 This 
shows the limitations of any model of medicalization postulating a simple 
substitution of lay with learned medical knowledge, as more complex 
exchanges can be observed here.
Like all lenders ghting to recoup their money, Cecilia’s husband had 
to demonstrate that childbirth had been the one and only cause of death. 
Although it is hard to establish how often controversies over women’s 
deaths would end up in court, they would all involve the production of 
coherent medical histories arguing that a woman’s parturition had been 
far from normal and that the ensuing health problems were linked in a 
chain of medical cause and effect.97 Under nancial pressure, healthy 
childbirths were construed as pathological. Pathological pregnant bodies 
routinely called for medical experts, and disputes about the societas may 
have had the effect of increasing the currency of medical explanations 
of pregnancy and childbirth in society at large. Interestingly, the other 
side of the coin would also favor medical experts. As Cecilia’s case shows, 
in the legal framework even healthy and natural births, which historians 
have usually regarded as a female realm, had become medical in that 
their “healthiness” had to be proved. Even when physicians’ presence had 
not been required in the birthing room, they now had a reason to claim 
competence over normal births.
Zacchia’s consilium offers insight into another area of recent studies. 
Katharine Park has argued that starting with the late Middle Ages a transi-
tion occurred from a private and domestic approach to generation (the 
secrets possessed by women) to a situation in which female secrets had 
been “unveiled and disseminated by learned doctors in service of public 
interest and public good.”98 A fundamental step in the process that led to 
“a regime of anatomical publicity” was print.99 Nothing, however, could be 
more public than a courtroom, even in the shielded evidence gathering 
of the Roman canon procedure. The case of Cecilia shows how details of 
96. On the routine access of ordinary Romans to courts of law: Ago, Economia barocca (n. 
3); Thomas V. Cohen and Elizabeth S. Cohen, Words and Deeds in Renaissance Rome: Trials 
before the Papal Magistrates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
97. For the power of the legal sphere to reshape narratives about pregnancy: Gowing, 
Common Bodies (n. 18), 142–43.
98. Park, Secrets of Women (n. 15), 116. For the complementary argument that older 
women (and midwives) played a role in making public the secrets of generation, and for 
a useful discussion of early modern boundaries between public and private with regard to 
female bodies, Gowing, Common Bodies (n. 18).
99. Park, Secrets of Women (n. 15), 120, and on the role of print, 116.
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a woman’s pregnancy and parturition were presented, assessed, and chal-
lenged by judges, witnesses, and physicians. We do not know what all the 
dead women would have made of what was by all accounts a public display 
of their bodies, but judging by the readiness with which their families com-
plied, secrets of women had really come a long way away from the private 
and domestic sphere. As male clerics, judges of the Rota and of some other 
Roman courts adjudicating on societas disputes were the people we might 
expect least likely to deal with female bodies. Yet in seventeenth-century 
Rome, the topic of women’s conversations in the birthing room could 
easily move out of the enclosed space of connement to be scrutinized 
and discussed in the all-male space of the courtroom.
Conclusion
A woman’s death in childbirth was a tragedy early modern families experi-
enced all too often and all over Europe, but in Rome the societas contracts 
transformed it into a contentious and public event. As for other issues 
arising from generation, for example paternity disputes, the ensuing con-
troversies reveal how social and economic concerns prompted medical 
debates, especially through physicians’ forensic activities. Responding to 
the request for expertise from jurists, Roman doctors discussed pregnancy 
and childbirth with remarkable gusto. Physicians’ familiarity with issues of 
generation is a growing area of investigation, but the Roman discussions 
make particularly visible the contours of their expected knowledge and 
the pressure from their legal role to expand it. I have shown how the lit-
erature on which Cagnati, Perlini, and Zacchia variously drew still allowed 
for disagreement on key questions such as the nature of pregnancy—a 
fundamentally natural process or almost a disease—and also that physi-
cians were claiming competence either way. This was not simply mastery 
of a textual tradition but was rather rooted in, and may have enriched, 
physicians’ professional engagement with gynecological issues such as the 
treatment of pregnancy’s illnesses and the dangers of the postpartum.
Furthermore, the terms of the societas contract urged physicians to focus 
on childbirth as the strongest cause of death that would allow exemp-
tion. In their discussions Cagnati and Zacchia mobilized anatomical and 
physiological knowledge of childbirth as well as of its potentially preter-
natural elements. This was not about claiming expertise in the manual 
task of delivering a baby; man-midwifery did not emerge in Rome in the 
early seventeenth century, nor did female support networks disappear or 
lose importance. But the medical debates surrounding women’s deaths 
reveal a dimension of male involvement with the birthing body that has 
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been eclipsed in received accounts: physicians were prepared to regard 
childbirth—its normal progress as well as its troubles—as one in the 
series of the events leading to procreation, and this they unanimously 
considered within their remit. The legal controversies made the status 
of parturition the bone of contention—natural and healthy or the cause 
of illness and death—urging all those involved to take a broader look at 
the events surrounding childbirth, from the progress of pregnancy to the 
postpartum period. I have argued that from this larger perspective the 
distinction between normal and difcult childbirth on which historians 
have focused (and the different expertise associated with each) would 
have appeared narrow to contemporaries, and in two ways: the nature of 
childbirth was open to negotiation and physicians could be required to 
demonstrate medically that it had been healthy.
The second area illuminated by the Roman disputes is how the dis-
tinctive feature of learned medicine—understanding through causes— 
translated into medicolegal practice and shaped physicians’ encounters 
with jurists. Unsurprisingly, what could be framed as a dry issue of logic 
had major consequences. Preoccupied with legal and moral implications, 
jurists objected to the less than stringent denition of cause in the medi-
cal tradition—potentially a blanket exemption for all pregnant women. 
But the ongoing exchanges between doctors and jurists fostered by the 
legal system allowed physicians such as Zacchia to argue for the specic 
epistemology of legal medicine and claim a fundamental role in resolv-
ing social controversies.
This was not just about the clashes of experts. Focusing on the court-
room has dramatized the dynamics between the different kinds of knowl-
edge that were enacted there. Many people could be involved in the 
disputes stirred by the contract, as parties, as witnesses (lay or expert), 
or as judges. The courtroom provided an arena where views on preg-
nancy and childbirth would intersect. Parties claiming exemption would 
produce histories of women’s pathological pregnancy, parturition, and 
puerperium. They mobilized a range of widely held explanations about 
the risks of pregnancy and childbirth, the same with which more generally 
women and their families would make sense of childbirth deaths. As the 
expression of broader perceptions of the body, many such views were non-
medical. However, I have argued that the legal experience created by the 
contract—especially the requirement that the direct and immediate cause 
be identied and the consequent presence of medical experts—would 
encourage the parties’ appropriation of medical discourse. InQuential 
work on early modern medicine has focused on how the learned approach 
of physicians gradually undermined lay, and especially female, claims to 
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authority. But when we enlarge our view to consider the range of actors 
involved in legal disputes, the model of a competition between lay and 
medical knowledge is too simple. While expert witnesses engaged with, 
and in part depended on, lay testimonies, the parties took full advantage 
of the power of medical reasoning. In the courtroom, ordinary people, not 
just physicians, sought the benets of a doctrinally sound medical expla-
nation. Judges too were part of these dynamics, and I have highlighted 
the legal tradition and exemplary cases through which they would make 
sense of women’s deaths, but also their broader social concerns and their 
role as arbiters between expert views and common opinion, an essential 
component of ancien régime justice. At the center of clashing interests 
and understood through different ways of knowing that variously inter-
sected in the courtroom, Roman deaths in childbirth add to our growing 
appreciation of how the political and economic signicance of pregnancy 
made secrets of women public.
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